What happens if my Supabase service key leaks?
The service_role key bypasses Row Level Security entirely. Whoever has it can read, change, and delete any row in any table, regardless of your policies. It is the most dangerous thing you can expose in a Supabase app.
If it leaks, for example it ended up in your frontend bundle instead of staying on the server, treat it as an emergency. Anyone who copied it has full access to your database until you act.
The fix has two parts, and both matter: rotate the key in the Supabase dashboard first so the leaked value stops working, then remove it from anywhere public. Removing it alone is not enough, because the old value is already out.
Check whether a service key is in your live app
What it means
A value shaped like a private key or password is in code your site serves, where anyone can read it. If it still works, anyone who copies it can act as you: run up bills, read your data, or send email in your name. xlogs did not test it.
Why AI tools cause it
AI coding tools often paste an API key straight into a file to make something work, instead of hiding it in a private environment variable. It runs fine, so nothing warns you.
How xlogs checks it
xlogs scans your live JavaScript against 18 key formats covering Stripe (live, test and webhook secrets), OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, Google, GitHub, Slack, private key blocks, and Supabase server keys (service_role and sb_secret_).
How to fix it
The goal: The exposed key has been replaced and revoked at the provider, because removing it from the code does not stop it working, and the new value is stored only in a server-side secret or environment variable, never in code or the client bundle.
- Contain and rotate the exposed key first, because removing it from the code does not stop it working: if you suspect it is being misused, revoke it at the provider now; otherwise create a replacement, put it in the app's server-side secret settings, confirm the app works with it, and then revoke the exposed key promptly
- Remove the literal value from the code and any client-side bundle (the affected spot), so the key is read only from a server-only environment variable
- Make sure the .env file is in .gitignore
- Clear the old value from deployed builds and caches, and from the repository's history where you can; once the key is revoked, a copy left there no longer works
In my app (the spot the scan shows): a credential-shaped value is publicly served. Please make this true: The exposed key has been replaced and revoked at the provider, because removing it from the code does not stop it working, and the new value is stored only in a server-side secret or environment variable, never in code or the client bundle. Steps: Contain and rotate the exposed key first, because removing it from the code does not stop it working: if you suspect it is being misused, revoke it at the provider now; otherwise create a replacement, put it in the app's server-side secret settings, confirm the app works with it, and then revoke the exposed key promptly; Remove the literal value from the code and any client-side bundle (the spot the scan shows), so the key is read only from a server-only environment variable; Make sure the .env file is in .gitignore; Clear the old value from deployed builds and caches, and from the repository's history where you can; once the key is revoked, a copy left there no longer works. Then tell me exactly what you changed, and do not print any secret values back to me or write one into a commit message, a pull request description or a log.
Then verify: After you deploy the fix, xlogs re-scans your live app and reports whether the key is still found in what it reads. That cannot show the old key was revoked, so revoke it at the provider either way.
Full step-by-step fix guide, with a copy-paste block for each AI tool →
Common questions
How would a service key even end up in my frontend?
Usually an AI tool or a copy-paste put it in a file that is part of the client build, to make a server-side call work quickly. It runs fine, so nothing warns you, and then it ships to every visitor. A scan of the live bundle catches it.